Co-organized by CIUS and the Ukrainian Professional and Business Club of Edmonton, the forty- sixth Shevchenko lecture at the University of Alberta was given by James Sherr, a senior fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), who spoke on “Ukraine and the Russian Question” (9 March 2012).
Mr. Sherr analyzed the Russian factor in the current Ukrainian historical and political situation. Speaking about the legacy of Kyivan Rus' which Russians claim as the wellspring of the imperial tradition constructed by their eighteenth-century tsars, he noted that while some specifics of the Russo- Ukrainian relationship may have changed with Ukraine’s declaration of independence in 1991, its fundamental nature has not. He referred in particular to the complex issue of identity, which has been at the core of recurring tensions between the two nations. Citing Vladimir Putins recent article on the national question in Russia, Sherr noted its concept of a common Russian civilization with the Russian nation as its constituent core. This notion has invariably served to justify imperial expansion into neighbouring regions.
Mr. Sherr argued that there have been no significant changes in Russia’s attitude toward Ukraine since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Recovering from what Putin called the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century,” today’s Russian leadership seeks to restore Moscow’s former “sphere of influence” and recapture the proud past of the Russian imperial state. The recent war with Georgia, the territorial provocations at Tuzla, the use of energy as a political tool, and attempts to thwart Ukraine’s European aspirations are all indications of Russia’s real intentions with regard to Ukraine. Russia certainly feels threatened because of its loss of superpower status, said Mr. Sherr, but it is concerned above all to maintain its imperial legacy and identity, not least by developing an increasingly authoritarian political culture. Putin’s anti-Western attitude and traditional Soviet-era beliefs strike a responsive chord with many Russians, which allows him to advance his current political agenda while Europe and other Western countries are preoccupied with their own economic and political problems.
Mr. Sherr argued that it is in the best interest of the Euro-Atlantic democracies to preserve an independent Ukraine and promote the development of its civil society and cultural institutions. He emphasized that Ukraine’s sovereignty must be respected in accordance with international law. A democratic and European Ukraine would thus serve as a model to democratize Russia, which will otherwise remain a source of authoritarianism in the region.
Mr. Sherr concluded that the greatest threat to Ukraine is Ukraine itself. Despite ongoing attempts by the West to encourage political and economic reforms, Ukraine has largely squandered these opportunities. It failed to act on its proclaimed European aspirations, entailing a market economy and political democracy, and remained mired in post-Soviet inertia, a non-transparent business culture, and a drift toward authoritarianism.
Between 1995 and May 2008, James Sherr was a fellow of the former Conflict Studies Research Centre of the Defence Academy of the UK and is a member of the Social Studies Faculty of Oxford University. He has been a long-standing adviser to governments in the UK and the EU and to NATO, and advised Ukraine for many years on defence/security sector reform and related issues. His publications include Russia and the West A Reassessment (2008) and The Mortgaging of Ukraine’s Independence (2010).
Co-organized by CIUS and the Ukrainian Professional and Business Club of Edmonton, the forty- sixth Shevchenko lecture at the University of Alberta was given by James Sherr, a senior fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), who spoke on “Ukraine and the Russian Question” (9 March 2012).
Mr. Sherr analyzed the Russian factor in the current Ukrainian historical and political situation. Speaking about the legacy of Kyivan Rus' which Russians claim as the wellspring of the imperial tradition constructed by their eighteenth-century tsars, he noted that while some specifics of the Russo- Ukrainian relationship may have changed with Ukraine’s declaration of independence in 1991, its fundamental nature has not. He referred in particular to the complex issue of identity, which has been at the core of recurring tensions between the two nations. Citing Vladimir Putins recent article on the national question in Russia, Sherr noted its concept of a common Russian civilization with the Russian nation as its constituent core. This notion has invariably served to justify imperial expansion into neighbouring regions.
Mr. Sherr argued that there have been no significant changes in Russia’s attitude toward Ukraine since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Recovering from what Putin called the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century,” today’s Russian leadership seeks to restore Moscow’s former “sphere of influence” and recapture the proud past of the Russian imperial state. The recent war with Georgia, the territorial provocations at Tuzla, the use of energy as a political tool, and attempts to thwart Ukraine’s European aspirations are all indications of Russia’s real intentions with regard to Ukraine. Russia certainly feels threatened because of its loss of superpower status, said Mr. Sherr, but it is concerned above all to maintain its imperial legacy and identity, not least by developing an increasingly authoritarian political culture. Putin’s anti-Western attitude and traditional Soviet-era beliefs strike a responsive chord with many Russians, which allows him to advance his current political agenda while Europe and other Western countries are preoccupied with their own economic and political problems.
Mr. Sherr argued that it is in the best interest of the Euro-Atlantic democracies to preserve an independent Ukraine and promote the development of its civil society and cultural institutions. He emphasized that Ukraine’s sovereignty must be respected in accordance with international law. A democratic and European Ukraine would thus serve as a model to democratize Russia, which will otherwise remain a source of authoritarianism in the region.
Mr. Sherr concluded that the greatest threat to Ukraine is Ukraine itself. Despite ongoing attempts by the West to encourage political and economic reforms, Ukraine has largely squandered these opportunities. It failed to act on its proclaimed European aspirations, entailing a market economy and political democracy, and remained mired in post-Soviet inertia, a non-transparent business culture, and a drift toward authoritarianism.
Between 1995 and May 2008, James Sherr was a fellow of the former Conflict Studies Research Centre of the Defence Academy of the UK and is a member of the Social Studies Faculty of Oxford University. He has been a long-standing adviser to governments in the UK and the EU and to NATO, and advised Ukraine for many years on defence/security sector reform and related issues. His publications include Russia and the West A Reassessment (2008) and The Mortgaging of Ukraine’s Independence (2010).
]]>https://cius-archives.ca/items/show/2008 On 3 December the final Institute seminar of the autumn semester in Toronto was given by Dr. Wsevolod Isajiw, professor of sociology at the University of Toronto. Dr. Isajiw spoke on "Multiculturalism and the Future of Ukrainian Culture and Society in Ukraine and Canada: A Comparative Approach."
The factors conditioning the future development of the Ukrainian community are: (1) cultural institutions, (2) those sectors of the community providing a social base for the development of institutions and (3) ideologies articulating and justifying organized activity and collective action.
In Ukraine, since the end of World War II, there has been intensive urbanization involving a large proportion of migrants from the Russian republic and a process of social mobility resulting in competition between Ukrainians and immigrating Russians. In this competition Ukrainians have been at a disadvantage, as witnessed by the numerical decline of Ukrainian together with a strengthening of Russian cultural institutions. The current dissent in Ukraine has to be understood against this background: the dissidents are an active social base defending Ukrainian institutions in the face of threat and are spokesmen who are articulating a new, human rights ideology. Their success will depend upon possible support from other important social sectors in Ukraine and on the successes of other human rights movements in the Soviet Union, especially in the Russian republic.
In Canada, migration to cities has meant a loss of Ukrainian language, but not necessarily a complete loss of identity. Different sectors in the Ukrainian community have different orientations toward retention of Ukrainian cultural institutions. Six definitions of multiculturalism as an ideology can be distinguished; different sectors of the community provide the social base for each definition. Two such definitions reflect those who stress retention of Ukrainian institutions as they have been and those who emphasize development. Unlike in Ukraine, retention of Ukrainian identity in Canada will depend on creative development of Ukrainian culture in the context of general Canadian institutions and on further development of Ukrainian "elites" in the context of society as a whole rather than in the ethnic group alone.
On 3 December the final Institute seminar of the autumn semester in Toronto was given by Dr. Wsevolod Isajiw, professor of sociology at the University of Toronto. Dr. Isajiw spoke on "Multiculturalism and the Future of Ukrainian Culture and Society in Ukraine and Canada: A Comparative Approach."
The factors conditioning the future development of the Ukrainian community are: (1) cultural institutions, (2) those sectors of the community providing a social base for the development of institutions and (3) ideologies articulating and justifying organized activity and collective action.
In Ukraine, since the end of World War II, there has been intensive urbanization involving a large proportion of migrants from the Russian republic and a process of social mobility resulting in competition between Ukrainians and immigrating Russians. In this competition Ukrainians have been at a disadvantage, as witnessed by the numerical decline of Ukrainian together with a strengthening of Russian cultural institutions. The current dissent in Ukraine has to be understood against this background: the dissidents are an active social base defending Ukrainian institutions in the face of threat and are spokesmen who are articulating a new, human rights ideology. Their success will depend upon possible support from other important social sectors in Ukraine and on the successes of other human rights movements in the Soviet Union, especially in the Russian republic.
In Canada, migration to cities has meant a loss of Ukrainian language, but not necessarily a complete loss of identity. Different sectors in the Ukrainian community have different orientations toward retention of Ukrainian cultural institutions. Six definitions of multiculturalism as an ideology can be distinguished; different sectors of the community provide the social base for each definition. Two such definitions reflect those who stress retention of Ukrainian institutions as they have been and those who emphasize development. Unlike in Ukraine, retention of Ukrainian identity in Canada will depend on creative development of Ukrainian culture in the context of general Canadian institutions and on further development of Ukrainian "elites" in the context of society as a whole rather than in the ethnic group alone.
Description: At the Institute's first seminar of the 1977-78 academic year on October 5, 1977, Dr. J Borys, professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, spoke about "The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine." / In his presentation. Dr. Borys dealt with the manner in which the Soviet Russian sphere of influence had expanded into Ukraine, as a case study of the application of the Marxian-Leninist theory of the self-determination of nations in one of the most important regions of eastern Europe. After seizing power in Russia proper in 1917, the Russian Bolsheviks, contrary to their own theoretical premises and claims, began to reincorporate non-Russian territories into the new Soviet Russian empire. The introduction of control by Moscow in Ukraine, which by that time had established its own government, was the result of military conquest. Dr. Borys argued, and not, as Soviet historiography claims, of support from the Ukrainian proletariat. If it had not been for military assistance from outside, the local Bolsheviks would not have succeeded in establishing their control in Ukraine. / Dr. Borys has received a grant from the Institute to revise his book on the above topic, which was originally published in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1960.